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Abstract—Cyber-physical control systems, such as industrial
control systems (ICS), are increasingly targeted by cyberattacks.
Such attacks can potentially cause tremendous damage, affect
critical infrastructure or even jeopardize human life when the
system does not behave as intended. Cyberattacks, however, are
not new and decades of security research have developed plenty of
solutions to thwart them. Unfortunately, many of these solutions
cannot be easily applied to safety-critical cyber-physical systems.
Further, the attack surface of ICS is quite different from what
can be commonly assumed in classical IT systems.
We present SCADMAN, a system with the goal to preserve
the Control Behavior Integrity (CBI) of distributed cyber-physical
systems. By observing the system-wide behavior, the correctness
of individual controllers in the system can be verified. This allows
SCADMAN to detect a wide range of attacks against controllers,
like programmable logic controller (PLCs), including malware
attacks, code-reuse and data-only attacks. We implemented and
evaluated SCADMAN based on a real-world water treatment
testbed for research and training on ICS security. Our results
show that we can detect a wide range of attacks–including attacks
that have previously been undetectable by typical state estimation
techniques–while causing no false-positive warning for nominal
threshold values.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control system (ICS) are used in a multitude
of control systems across several applications of industrial
sectors and critical infrastructures, including electric power
transmission and distribution, oil and natural gas production,
refinery operations, water treatment systems, wastewater col-
lection systems, as well as pipeline transport systems [64]. ICS
typically consist of interconnected embedded systems, called
programmable logic controllers (PLCs). In a distributed ICS,
multiple PLCs jointly control a physical process or the physical
environment. Using a series of sensors and actuators, PLCs
can monitor the physical system’s state and control the system
behavior. This makes the correct functioning of PLCs crucial
for the correct and safe operation of these systems.
This critical role of the PLCs makes them a valuable
target for adversaries aiming to interfere with any of these
systems [9]. Past incidences show that such attacks are applied
in practice, often remaining undetected over a long period
of time. Examples include the infamous Stuxnet worm [29]
against Iranian nuclear uranium enrichment facilities as well
as the BlackEnergy crimeware [28] against the Ukranian train
railway and electricity power industries. These attacks demon-
strate impressively that targeted attacks on critical infrastruc-
ture can evade traditional cybersecurity detection and cause
catastrophic failures with substantive impact. The discoveries
of Duqu [21] and Havex [61] show that such attacks are not
isolated cases as they infected ICS in more than eight coun-
tries. Nation-state ICS malware has typically either targeted the
control programs of PLCs or the central control infrastructure
(e.g., operator workstations). However, academic research has
demonstrated even more sophisticated attacks against ICS and
PLCs that can circumvent existing defense mechanisms by
manipulating the PLC’s firmware and incorporating physics-
aware models into the attack code [31].
A comprehensive defense against ICS attacks needs to
protect against various attack vectors. (1) The software de-
termining a PLC’s behavior could be replaced by a malicious
program [16], [29], [44]. Updating the PLC control program
over the network is an intended functionality of PLCs to
allow central management. However, the control program can
also be manipulated if an attacker gains physical access to a
PLC. (2) The PLC firmware (which includes the OS) could
be manipulated/replaced either via the network or through
physical access [15], [31]. (3) The attack can exploit a memory
corruption vulnerability (e.g., buffer overflow [62]) in the
PLC’s control programs and/or firmware for code-injection or
to launch run-time attacks such as return-oriented program-
ming (ROP) [60], to manipulate a PLC’s behavior. (4) Memory
corruption vulnerabilities can be exploited to launch data-only
attacks [38] against a PLC to manipulate its behavior. For
instance, the initiation of a trigger-response may be inhibited
by manipulating the associated control parameters [59], e.g.,
a threshold value that determines whether the action must be
started.
For all above enumerated attack vectors, a common goal
of the adversary is to modify the physical behavior of the
system. As long as the attacked device behaves correctly the
overall system will continue to operate correctly. Therefore,
the ultimate goal of the attacker will always be to change a
device’s behavior.
Previous works in defending against ICS attacks focus
only on a subset of the above listed attack vectors. These
approaches can be generally categorized into two categories:
defenses that focus on verifying the integrity of the software
running on a PLC and defenses that verify the behavior of the
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overall ICS based on models that abstract control decisions of
the PLC software. In the former case, PLC-based verification
solutions typically cannot account for attacks which replace
and/or modify either the application layer programs or the
underlying firmware. For instance, ECFI [4] provides protec-
tion against run-time attacks targeting PLC control programs,
but does not protect against data-only attacks nor maliciously
modified/replaced control programs or firmware. Orpheus [20]
monitors the behavior of a device’s control program based
on the invoked system calls. Attacks are detected based on a
finite-state machine (FSM) representing the control program’s
benign system call behavior. Orpheus’ behavior monitor is
placed inside the device’s OS, hence, a compromised OS can
disable and circumvent its protection mechanism.
Similarly, solutions that enforce compliance via state es-
timation [10] or cyber-physical access control [27] from
within the PLC could be circumvented as well. Zeus [37]
uses side-channel analysis to verify the software control flow
of programs running on a PLC, but cannot defend against
firmware modifications nor sensor data attacks. By extension,
offline, static analysis of control programs being loaded onto
PLCs [53] [23] provides even less run-time guarantees. For
ICS-based verification techniques, it has been shown that state
estimation can be used to infer the control commands issued
by distributed controllers [26] or to detect false data injection
attacks [51] based on the sensor data. Such protection mech-
anisms may be circumvented via physics-aware attacks [31],
[32]. Further, supervised machine learning has been used to
characterize physical invariants of the CPS [19]. However, such
approaches depend on the training data to include all corner
cases of the system execution and are not based on the control
flow of the software.
We present SCADMAN, the first control behavior integrity
(CBI) solution for distributed industrial control systems. Un-
like previous state estimation approaches SCADMAN does not
abstract the behavior of the cyber-components (i.e., PLCs).
Instead, SCADMAN precisely simulates the state of all PLCs.
By monitoring the input and output behavior of the entire ICS,
SCADMAN can detect inconsistencies within the actions of
PLCs. To enable a global view of the entire ICS, a consolidated
control program of all PLCs in the system is generated to
resolve functional dependencies between individual programs.
The consolidated control program in conjunction with a phys-
ical state estimator is used to determine a set of acceptable
states at any particular point in time. For that, SCADMAN needs
means to analyze which control-flow paths are valid given
the current system state. Based on this context-aware control-
flow path analysis, SCADMAN determines benign resulting
states. Comparing the set of benign states against the reported
sensor readings and actuation commands from the ICS allows
SCADMAN to detect anomalies in the system behavior. This
makes SCADMAN agnostic to the various attack technique
listed above, that can be used to cause a PLC to deviate from
its intended behavior and makes SCADMAN a powerful tool to
protect ICS against a wide range of attack vectors.
We evaluated SCADMAN on real-world industrial control
system equipment [40], which are the quasi-standard for secu-
rity research validation in the context of ICS [18], [19], [35],
[39], [42], [45], [49], [57], [65], [67], [68]. Simulation-based
evaluation does not provide a viable option for SCADMAN. In
general, simulations are based on models of an ICS similar
to SCADMAN. Hence, such an evaluation would validate the
accuracy of our models against the model of the simulator–
leading to no meaningful results.
We make the following contributions:
• We present SCADMAN, the first control behavior in-
tegrity system for distributed ICS based on a model
comprising cyber and physical components.
• Our solution does not require any changes to the hard-
ware or software of the PLCs, making it independent
of the PLC manufacturers. Furthermore, leaving the
PLCs unmodified is important for safety certifications
to remain valid in the presence of SCADMAN.
• We provide an automated solution that allows SCAD-
MAN to consolidate the control programs of all PLCs
in an ICS. This allows us to comprehensively simulate
the control behavior of the entire system, which is
important for detecting inconsistent behavior across
the borders of individual PLCs.
• We implemented SCADMAN using the MATIEC com-
piler from the OpenPLC project for automated gen-
eration of the consolidated PLC control program and
LLVM for instrumentation of the consolidated PLC
control program.
• We evaluated SCADMAN on real-world ICS network
equipment. The results were very promising. Using its
runtime control behavior monitoring, SCADMAN was
able to detect all the attacks of different types against
the platform in a time manner.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we
provide background on the most relevant topics related to
our work (industrial control systems, control-flow integrity
and cyber-physical system modeling) in Section II. We define
the assumptions and system model underlying our work in
Section III. In Section IV we explain the design and main
ideas of SCADMAN. We detail on our implementation in
Section V. In Section VI we discuss SCADMAN’s security for
various attack scenarios and present our evaluation results in
Section VII. Relevant related work is discussed in Section VIII.
Section IX proposes future work directions, while Section X
concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we first provide background on industrial
control systems (ICS) in general. Afterwards we introduce
two concepts–control-flow integrity (CFI) and cyber-physical
systems modeling–which have been used in the past in an
attempt to secure ICS, however, none of them are sufficient
to solve this challenge.
Industrial Control Systems. Programmable logic controllers
(PLC) are cyber-physical systems that are used to control
industrial appliances. PLCs feature input and output modules,
which translate physical inputs – in most cases current on a
wire–into digital values and vice versa, to interact with the
physical appliances like sensors and actuators.
PLCs can convert sensor readings into digital values, pro-
cess the readings with the built-in computing unit, and forward
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the outputs to actuators to manipulate the physical world.
Based on the available information about the system state, a
PLC calculates the next actuations to steer the system towards a
desired state. The program running on the PLC, called control
logic, defines the control algorithm used to decide actuations.
The control logic program(s) of a PLC are Turing complete and
programmable using the development environments provided
by the PLC manufacturers. The target system state towards
which the PLC is working can be fixed in the control logic or
could be set dynamically over the network by the ICS operator.
Control logic programs can be loaded onto PLCs and run
on top of a privileged software layer like a real-time operating
system (RTOS). This privileged software layer contained in the
PLC’s firmware provides services to the control logic programs
(e.g., networking, storage) and manages the programs’ updates
and execution. The control logic programs are executed repeat-
edly in fixed intervals, called scan cycles. Furthermore, in a
distributed ICS, the physical process is jointly controlled by
multiple PLCs. To do so, PLCs are usually connected through
a computer network, allowing them to share information like
sensor readings or internal states.
The PLCs in an ICS are usually managed and monitored
through central management systems, called Supervisory Con-
trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA). Typical components of a
SCADA system are historians, which are databases logging
data from all control devices in the ICS, IT infrastructure
servers that connect the ICS to other systems such as a supply
chain management system, human machine interfaces (HMI),
which allow an operator to interactively control the system,
and operator workstations that provide interactive control as
well as PLC reprogramming.
The control logic running on the PLCs is highly application
specific and is usually programmed by the plant operator itself.
In particular, while the firmware and development tools for
PLCs are usually closed source, the operator has full access
to the control logic of the PLCs. In order to design and setup
a control system, the operator usually needs knowledge, i.e.,
a model, of the physical processes in the system.
Control-Flow Integrity. Control-flow integrity (CFI) is a
defense mechanism against run-time attacks. Modern run-time
attacks do not inject or modify the code of a system. Instead,
they reuse the existing code by hijacking the control flow of a
program in order to cause unintended, malicious program be-
havior [60]. These attacks have been demonstrated on various
platforms and devices, including embedded architectures like
ARM [46], SPARC [17] and Atmel AVR [30].
CFI enforces that a program’s control flow does not deviate
from the developer-intended flow. The integrity of the program
flow is ensured by validating for each control-flow decision
if the executed path lies within the program’s control-flow
graph [1], [3].
In the context of ICS, the guarantees provided by CFI
are not sufficient. In particular, data-only attacks like data-
oriented programming (DOP) [38] pose a severe threat to
PLCs. Simple modifications like changing a threshold value
can have catastrophic consequences, e.g., in the attack against
a steel-mill, the blast furnace cloud not be turned off due to
compromised controllers, resulting in massive damage.1
Cyber-Physical Systems Modeling. ICS comprise a class of
cyber-physical systems that can be modeled as hybrid systems,
or systems whose continuous evolution (physical equations)
evolve based on the discrete-state transitions (controller actu-
ations) of the system [13].
For instance, in Figure 1 a simplified example of two PLCs
controlling the mixing and filling of colors is shown. Four input
colors are mixed and filled into cans. The input of each color
is controlled by PLC1, which controls the respective valves.
PLC2 controls the conveyor belt, using a scale to determine
when the current can is full and the next one has to be placed
under the mixer. The pseudo code and control-flow graph show
the relation between the actions of PLC1 and the readings
of PLC2, i.e., the operations of PLC1 determine the physical
behavior observed by PLC2. In such a hybrid system, the
closing of the valve is a discrete event. The time required
to fill a single can, on the other hand, will increase gradually
(evolve continuously).
C M Y K
PLC2
PLC1
if(yellow_input > 0)
{
open_valve_y();
}
else
{
close_valve_y();
}
open_valve_y();
𝑓(𝑥) =  𝑥1
if(y_input > 1)
𝑓(𝑥) =  𝑥0
close_valve_y();
𝑓(𝑥) =  𝑥2
Figure 1: Simplified Industrial Control System, two PLCs
control the mixing of four input colors–cyan (C), magenta (M),
yellow (Y) and black (K for Key)–and filling into cans. PLC1’s
control actions on the valves of the individual color tanks will
have an effect on the filling rate measured by PLC2.
In the context of ICS, state estimation techniques have been
leveraged to model physical dynamics for particular discrete
events of the system [25], [27]. However, the actuation of
the associated controlling devices are typically abstracted to
simplify the complexity of the model, neglecting the under-
lying control-flow behavior of any running programs. This
simplification opens up these systems to motivated adversaries
that exploit such abstractions to launch stealthy attacks [43].
III. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we present the system model and adversary
model considered in this paper.
1https://www.wired.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hack-destruction/
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A. System Model
We consider large distributed industrial control systems
(ICS) with a centralized monitoring system (SCADA). This is
the predominant system design [64] for large scale industrial
plants. The ICS consists of networked controllers (PLCs)
that jointly control a (complex) physical process, where the
actions of the individual PLCs are interdependent. In particular,
actuations initiated by one PLC effect the system state which
will be represented in the sensor readings of other PLCs.
This means that all PLCs are indirectly connected with each
other through the physical dynamics of the controlled physical
system.2
Each PLC is connected to its own local array of sensors and
actuators.3 These sensors and actuators are directly interfacing
with the physical system, and associated discrete sampled
values are accessed by the PLCs.
In addition to the indirect connection between PLCs, all
components of a distributed ICS are also connected explicitly.
That said, all PLCs are connected to each other and to SCADA
over a computer network, e.g., Ethernet. By means of the
computer network, input and output data of all PLCs are
reported to the SCADA system, where data is recorded in a
historian database and can be viewed by the operator.
B. Adversary Model
The adversary’s goal is to cause misbehavior of the ICS
while remaining undetected. The behavior of the system refers
to the actions that influence the physical process controlled by
the ICS. In particular, the adversary alters control commands
sent to physical appliances (actuators) that can change the state
of the physical process. Passive attacks that do not alter the
system behavior, e.g., attacks that ex-filtrate data, are out of
scope in this work.
ICS usually have built-in safety functions that will be
triggered by rapid changes of the system state or control
commands that set system parameters far outside of the valid
range. Therefore, the adversary needs to make sure not to
trigger these safety mechanisms. Similarly, ICS are usually
monitored by a human operator. The adversary has to make
sure that her manipulations do not cause suspicion on the
operator’s side [31], i.e., the attack needs to be stealthy. This
precludes naïve attacks like denial-of-service (DoS) on devices
or the network.
Number of Compromised PLCs: The adversary can com-
promise one (or a small subset) of PLCs in a distributed ICS.
The attacker in our adversary model has knowledge about
the attacked system, so we have to assume a compromised
PLC will report legitimate sensor values. Furthermore, we
assume that the attacker is not able to compromise all PLCs
in the ICS. We argue that this is a realistic assumption due to
different reasons. For instance, in a geographically distributed
ICS, the adversary might have physical access to some PLCs
in a remote station of the plant. This is relevant if the attacker
2Note, the system does not need to be “fully” connected, i.e., the actuations
of one PLC are not required to be observed by all other PLCs.
3For simplicity we assume local sensors and actuators, however, remote I/O
devices, i.e., networked sensors and actuators, can be modeled in our system
as “PLCs without computations”.
compromises PLCs via physical access, e.g., by updating the
control logic via USB, replacing storage media like an SD-
Memory card, or through debugging interfaces like JTAG [34].
Furthermore, PLCs often have physical switches that deactivate
the remote update functionality, i.e., an adversary has to have
physical access to a PLC before being able to modify its
software remotely. Other reasons why an adversary cannot
compromise all PLCs of a plant include systems which consist
of heterogeneous PLCs, i.e., PLCs with different hardware or
firmware versions, different models, or even from different
vendors. If the adversary has knowledge about a vulnerability
in one of the PLC variants, he can compromise these but not
the other PLCs of the system. Also, PLCs might be isolated in
different network segments, exposing only a subset to a remote
attacker.
We assume that the adversary has complete control over the
compromised PLC, i.e., she can compromise the firmware and
the control logic of the PLC. The adversary can gain control
over a PLC leveraging static or dynamic attack techniques. In
a static attack, the adversary replaces the software (firmware
or control logic) of a PLC, e.g., via a malicious software
update. Dynamic attacks are based on injecting new code at
run-time, manipulating the behavior of existing code by means
of return-oriented programming (ROP) [60], or data-oriented
programming (DOP) [38].
SCADMAN: We assume that SCADMAN itself is not com-
promised. SCADMAN executes on a separate system that is
isolated from all other system components, including operator
workstations and PLCs. Run-time attacks that can compromise
both a PLC and SCADMAN at the same time are particularly
hard to find due to the architectural differences between
them. PLCs are typically ARM or MIPS based systems while
SCADMAN is typically executed on an x86-based computer.
Further, we assume that the SCADMAN system is hardened
against cyber attacks using well-known defense mechanisms–
e.g., CFI [2], or SoftBound [55] and CETS [56]–and protected
against physical attacks, e.g., by being placed in a physically
protected environment. Malicious updates of the SCADMAN
system, e.g., through compromised operator workstations, can
be countered with standard methods such as digital signatures
and two factor authentication.4
Network Attacks: For the sake of simplicity we consider
network attacks out of scope. We assume a secure, i.e.,
integrity protected and authenticated channel between the
controllers and SCADMAN. We discuss network attacks and
defense mechanisms for settings without secure channels in
Section VI-C.
IV. OUR DESIGN
Before we describe our SCADMAN design and framework,
we discuss important challenges that we had to tackle for
SCADMAN.
A. Challenges
Important limitations in ICS stem from closed source, pro-
prietary software. Control software, firmware, and compilers
4Such methods cannot be easily retrofitted to protect software updates
of the PLCs themselves due to resource limitations and legacy compliance
requirements.
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are usually manufacturer specific and cannot be modified by
the customer. Thus, modification of the software running on
the PLC is not feasible as it would require cooperation of the
manufacturer. The control logic, on the other hand, is usually
developed by the plant operator, i.e., the operator has full
access to its source code.
Modifications of the PLC software also can lead to undesir-
able implications that will hinder adoption in practice. Safety
and reliability are paramount in ICS. Hence, all modifications
that could impact them are unlikely to be adapted. In particular,
in systems that require safety certification modifications of the
PLC software would void them, i.e., solutions that rely on the
modification of control-components cannot be used in highly-
sensitive environments.
Finally, having a comprehensive view of the system is
necessary to detect the various attacks mentioned before.
Although a single PLC may have access to monitor the values
of other sensors/actuators of the ICS, the maintenance of
state estimation of the physical processes will incur significant
overhead in the PLC scan cycle. Even if a PLC had the memory
resources for such state estimation, the computation of the state
estimation may cause a violation of the real-time constraints.
B. SCADMAN Design
The goal of SCADMAN is to ensure the correct behavior
of a distributed industrial control system (ICS). The correct
behavior can be violated by different types of attacks, as
discussed before in Section III-B. As a result, SCADMAN must
provide a general mechanism that can counter all possible
attacks that result in an incorrect control behavior of the
system. Control behavior includes any action taken by any of
the PLCs that modifies the overall system state. We consider
the control behavior as correct, if it fits the behavior intended
by the system operator. An attack can result in incorrect control
behavior, when the attacker makes one of the components
perform a different action than was intended. For example, a
PLC is supposed to close a valve when a certain threshold
is reached. The attacker then forces the PLC to keep the
valve open, contrary to the original programming of the PLC.
SCADMAN ensures the control behavior integrity (CBI) of an
ICS. A violation of CBI is a deviation from the intended
behavior of any of the PLCs within the ICS.
The system can also deviate from the intended state for
other reasons like faults, e.g., a faulty sensor reporting incor-
rect values. SCADMAN can detect these situations, allowing
the operator to repair the system.
Figure 2 shows the concept of SCADMAN. In a distributed
ICS, multiple PLCs interact independently with a physical
process. However, the actions of one PLC influence the overall
state of the physical system. This is reflected in the sensor
readings of other PLCs. We exploit this interdependency to
detect the misbehavior of a compromised PLC. For example,
a compromised PLC cannot stealthily open a valve because a
second trustworthy PLC, which is not under attacker control,
would measure the change in inflow. This discrepancy between
expected sensor readings and the actual system state is used
by SCADMAN to detect deviations in the control behavior.
SCADMAN-MONITOR: All PLCs report their actuation com-
mands and sensor readings to a central entity, which we
call SCADMAN-MONITOR. The SCADMAN-MONITOR is a
program that interacts with a simulated physical system and
allows SCADMAN to calculate the expected state of the overall
ICS. Note that centrally reporting and logging all operations
is very common in ICS [64], e.g., for reporting to HMI
components. Based on the retrieved data, the SCADMAN-
MONITOR will subsequently check whether any of the PLCs
have been deviating from the intended behavior, i.e., that all
PLCs have been following a small set of valid control flow
paths given the current system state. This check requires two
components of the SCADMAN-MONITOR. (1) A consolidated
control logic code of all PLCs, and (2) a model of the
physical process allowing SCADMAN-MONITOR to determine
the interdependencies of the PLCs’ inputs and outputs, shown
on the right in Figure 2.
SCADMAN generates the consolidated control logic which
combines the control logic of all PLCs into a single large
program that represents the entire control actions of the ICS.
This code is executed on the SCADMAN-MONITOR to deter-
mine valid actions of the PLCs. Based on the current state
of the overall system and the model of the system’s physical
state, SCADMAN dynamically derives the legitimate control-
flow paths through the PLC code in a physics-aware manner.
This means, SCADMAN does not accept all possible, benign
control-flow paths in the control logic’s control-flow graph as
valid, as is the case with CFI [1], [3], but only those that
are valid at any given time in the current state of the cyber
physical system (CPS). This approach limits the set of allowed
control-flow paths and thus the adversary’s actions.
The physical process model allows the SCADMAN-
MONITOR to estimate the influence of control commands sent
by PLCs on the expected sensor readings. As the adversary
cannot influence the physical model of the system (the laws of
physics cannot be altered), an inconsistency between actuation
commands and sensor readings implies that either the PLC
controlling the actuation or the PLC controlling the sensors
must behave incorrectly, i.e., issue wrong actuation commands
or report forged sensor readings. SCADMAN can tolerate
imprecise and incomplete models. The model quality largely
determines the detection precision. However, an imprecise
model, noisy sensors, and other factors impacting the state
estimation are handled by SCADMAN as described below and
in more details in Section V-C.
C. SCADMAN Framework
Our SCADMAN framework leverages a compiler-based
approach to automatically generate the consolidated PLC code
and connect it to the physical state estimator. Both are exe-
cuted in SCADMAN-MONITOR, as shown in Figure 3.
Physical State Estimation: The state estimator uses physical
models of the physical processes that are controlled by the
PLCs of the ICS. The state estimator simulates the evolution of
the physical system. Based on the current state of the physical
systems and actuation inputs to the system the state estimator
determines the following state of the system.
Physical systems usually evolve continuously, however, for
SCADMAN the system state at the sampling point is relevant,
i.e., at the points in time when a PLC reads the system state
using its sensors. Models of the physical processes in ICS
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Figure 2: SCADMAN system overview and architecture. The central control (SCADA) is extended with a component called
SCADMAN-MONITOR that monitors the behavior of the distributed ICS and can detect compromised controllers in the system.
are usually known by the operator of the plant. Additionally,
several recent works have developed methods to extract and
generate such models, which can be used with SCADMAN [25],
[27].
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Figure 3: SCADMAN scan cycle. For each interaction of a PLC
with the physical process, the SCADMAN-MONITOR performs
the corresponding operations using the state estimated based
on the system’s past events. Afterwards, consistency between
both sides (CPS and SCADMAN-MONITOR) is checked, and
an alarm is raised when a deviation is detected.
SCADMAN-MONITOR Operation: SCADMAN runs in parallel
with the CPS (on the left in Figure 3) and compares the sensor
readings and actuation commands it receives over the network
from all PLCs to a set of valid state determined by SCADMAN-
MONITOR–allowing for the validation of the behavior of the
CPS (i.e., distributed ICS).
SCADMAN-MONITOR works in iterations, similar to the
scan cycle based operations of PLCs. During each iteration
the current system state and actuation commands are fed into
the state estimator of SCADMAN-MONITOR, in parallel the
physical process in the CPS evolves, based on the current
system state and past actuation commands. The state estimator
calculates the state space into which the system should have
evolved based on its history, in Figure 3 the state variables
S1 . . . S3 have been predicted to lay within some given interval
of possible values. The fuzziness of the state space can be, for
instance, due to impressions of the physical model used in state
estimator or due to (small) errors in the input value. However,
SCADMAN can tolerate these impressions.
The actual physical state in the CPS is read by the
PLCs’s sensors and processed by them. In parallel, SCADMAN-
MONITOR executes the consolidated PLC using the estimated
state as input. Since the input state can be fuzzy the execution
of SCADMAN-MONITOR has to account for it. By using a
technique called error-margin multi-execution the execution
is performed over the entire range of possible input values
(see Section V-C for details). By executing–given the cur-
rent system state context–all valid control-flow paths in the
consolidated PLC SCADMAN-MONITOR determines the set of
possible outputs. Again, the outputs (O1 . . . O3 in Figure 3)
are represented as intervals or sets of allowed values.
When SCADMAN-MONITOR receives the sensor reading
and actuation command of the PLCs from the CPS it per-
forms the consistency check. If all PLCs were executing
correctly–and all sensors and actuators operated correctly–the
reported values must be a subset of the outputs determined
by SCADMAN-MONITOR. Any deviation indicates an incon-
sistency within the behavior of the CPS and SCADMAN rises
an alarm.
If the system was found to be correct the system state
reported by the PLCs is accepted as the current system state
and serves as input for the next iteration of SCADMAN-
MONITOR. This is necessary to prevent the system state
calculated by the state estimator to gradually deviate from the
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actual system state.5
V. SCADMAN IMPLEMENTATION
SCADMAN introduces the SCADMAN-MONITOR process,
which is responsible for receiving all sensor values and
actuations, and validating them using the consolidated PLC
code and state estimation. We propose a generic approach
to build the SCADMAN-MONITOR. We will first discuss how
SCADMAN consolidates the control programs for a distributed
PLC network along with the necessary assumptions for timing
and functional correctness. We then demonstrate how the
consolidated code will be compiled and instrumented into an
executable that can receive the state of the ICS network, e.g.,
the state of the sensors, as input for each scan cycle and
update the estimated state of the system. We also introduce
a novel approach, so-called error-margin multi-execution that
allows SCADMAN to account for cases where the model of
the physical system deviates from the real system. Finally,
we describe how these components of SCADMAN can be
combined with the physical state estimation to detect any
compromised components in the ICS.
PROGRAM p l c 1
VAR_INPUT
YellowAmount : REAL;
END_VAR
VAR_IN_OUT
Yel lowValve : BOOL;
END_VAR
IF ( YellowAmount > 0) THEN
Yel lowValve := 1 ;
ELSE
Yel lowValve := 0 ;
END_IF ;
END_PROGRAM
CONFIGURATION Conf ig0
RESOURCE Res0 ON PLC
TASK Main ( INTERVAL := T#1 s ,
PRIORITY := 0 ) ;
PROGRAM I n s t 0 WITH Main : p l c 1 ;
END_RESOURCE
END_CONFIGURATION
PROGRAM p l c 2
VAR_INPUT
CanWeight : REAL;
Yel lowValve : BOOL;
END_VAR
VAR_IN_OUT
ConveyorMove : BOOL;
END_VAR
IF ( CanWeight > 100 .0
AND NOT( Yel lowValve ) ) THEN
ConveyorMove := 1 ;
ELSE
ConveyorMove := 0 ;
END_IF ;
END_PROGRAM
CONFIGURATION Conf ig2
RESOURCE Res0 ON PLC
TASK Main ( INTERVAL := T#1 s ,
PRIORITY := 0 ) ;
PROGRAM I n s t 0 WITH Main : p l c 2 ;
END_RESOURCE
END_CONFIGURATION
(∗ Maste r PLC Code ∗)
PROGRAM m a s t e r
(∗ combined v a r i a b l e s ∗)
VAR_INPUT
YellowAmount : REAL;
CanWeight : REAL;
END_VAR
VAR_IN_OUT
Yel lowValve : BOOL;
ConveyorMove : BOOL;
END_VAR
(∗ p l c 1 code∗)
IF ( YellowAmount > 0) THEN
Yel lowValve := 1 ;
ELSE
Yel lowValve := 0 ;
END_IF ;
(∗ p l c 2 code∗)
IF ( CanWeight > 100 .0
AND NOT( F i l l i n g ) ) THEN
ConveyorMove := 1 ;
ELSE
ConveyorMove := 0 ;
END_IF ;
END_PROGRAM
(∗ m a s t e r c o n f i g u r a t i o n∗)
CONFIGURATION M a s t e r C o n f i g
RESOURCE Res0 ON PLC
TASK Main ( INTERVAL := T#1 s ,
PRIORITY := 0 ) ;
PROGRAM I n s t 0 WITH Main : m a s t e r ;
END_RESOURCE
END_CONFIGURATION
Figure 4: Code consolidation for two PLCs with respect to a
single process of the paint mixing plant in Figure 1. The left 2
programs, plc1 and plc2 are merged into a master PLC
code.
Example. For the purpose of clarity, we will provide a
simplified representation for a single process control for two
PLCs from the system in Figure 1. Figure 4 shows two
PLC programs, plc1 and plc2 that are consolidated by
5To detect and counter slow evolving attacks SCADMAN can be adapted
to simulate the system state over multiple iterations at the cost of added
impression in the state estimation (see Section IX).
SCADMAN into a single PLC representation, master. PLC1 is
responsible for controlling a valve, YellowValve, associated
with the yellow color dispenser. The valve will open if an
input amount is greater than 0. PLC2 is responsible for
moving the conveyor belt if the current can is full and if the
YellowValve is not open. Descriptive variable names have
been used in the code. This example will be used to explain
each component of the implementation.
A. PLC-Code Consolidation
The premise of generating a SCADMAN-MONITOR rep-
resentation is to first merge the control program code of all
the ICS PLC’s into a single PLC program representation.
This consolidated representation is necessary for two reasons.
First, in order to monitor the distributed processes, we need
access to all of the system parameters in order to successfully
simulate the physical model of the overall system, i.e., we
cannot simulate the physics of a process with partial sensor
data. In theory, the consolidation would not be necessary for
a subset of the PLCs that do not have any cyber-physical
interdependencies. However, these dependencies are difficult
to derive. As such, SCADMAN automatically generates mod-
els that incorporate these cyber-physical interdependencies as
long as the distributed system conforms to the assumptions
required to ensure functional and timing correctness, which
are discussed at the end of this subsection.
In this paper, we consider PLC control programs that
conform to the IEC 61131 standard [41]. According to the
standard, programs are typically composed of three types of
programming organisation units (POUs): programs, functions,
and function blocks. A program is the “main program” of
the PLC that includes I/O assignments, variable definitions,
and access paths. A function is a programming block that
returns a value given input and output variables in a similar
vein to function definitions for other procedural programming
languages such as C. A function block is a data structure
that has the same functionality as a function but retains the
associated values in memory across executions. As such, the
code consolidation process will append all of the function
and function block definitions and merging the main PLC
program of each PLC. This allows us to retrieve the state of all
sensors and actuators of the ICS, feed the values through this
consolidated representation, and observe how the actuators are
updated. Figure 4 illustrates how the main programs of two
PLC programs will be merged.
However, it is common practice to define different com-
ponents for a single PLC control program using different pro-
gramming languages. The IEC 61131 standard enumerates five
programming languages: (1) ladder diagrams (LD) – a graphi-
cal programming language to design logic circuits, (2) sequen-
tial function charts (SFC) – another graphical programming
language to define sequential state operations, (3) function
block diagrams (FBD) – a graphical representation of function
blocks, (4) instruction lists (IL) – an assembly-like textual
programming language, and (5) structured text (ST) – a textual
programming language similar to Pascal. The heterogeneity of
a PLC program significantly increases the complexity of any
form of static code analysis as compilation and simulation
rules would have to be defined for each language. As such,
SCADMAN first converts all programs to a single programming
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language representation. Previous works have formally proven
that the structured text (ST) programming language can be
used to represent the other four languages [24] and therefore
serves as our base programming language for the SCADMAN-
MONITOR.
We will now discuss the correctness of our consolidation
process and the necessary assumptions.
Timing correctness. The correctness of consolidating the
control logic of all PLCs depends on the required sampling
time of the ICS. PLC tasks can be executed either continuously
or periodically for some interval. For a distributed network of
N PLCs that are configured to run programs at varying sample
times, Tsample(i) for a PLCi, the consolidation is valid if and
only if the sum of the execution times, Texecution(i) of all
controller programs is less than the smallest task interval, i.e.,∑N
i=1 Texecution(i) < min∀i∈N Tsample(i).
For continuously executing PLC configurations–i.e., event-
driven control–the cumulative scanning time must be less
than the shortest duration time of an input or an output
signal [54]. The continuous scan cycle time of PLCs range
from microseconds to tenths of a second. However, because
SCADMAN is implemented on a standard computer with sub-
stantially more computing power than typical PLCs, the “scan
cycle” for SCADMAN’s consolidated PLC code is much faster
and, hence, the only bottleneck is the sampling time over
network communication. In the system shown in Figure 4,
the programs plc1 and plc2 are shown to have the same
execution interval timing, which is reflected in the consolidated
master program.
With respect to clock drift between PLCs, we assume that
the design of the overall ICS accounts for clock drift as such
a hindrance would be a pre-existing condition.
Functional correctness. We also consider the functional cor-
rectness of combining multiple control logic programs se-
quentially into a single control logic program. A PLC’s scan
cycle can be abstracted into three components: the scanning
of the inputs, the propagation of the inputs through a logic
circuit, and the updating of all associated outputs at the end of
the scan cycle. The SCADMAN-MONITOR program combines
the scanning of inputs and updating of outputs for all PLC
programs as these actions are atomic in nature. Previous
work has shown that separate processes update the values of
inputs/outputs to/from memory independent of the scan cycle
process [31].
Because the process of propagating the inputs through a
logic circuit to update the associated outputs is parallel in
nature across PLCs, we can inductively claim the correctness
of merging based on the timing correctness of our assumptions.
Furthermore, the ordering of the merging process is arbitrary
as any unsatisfied dependencies or race conditions amongst
PLCs would be a pre-existing nuisance in the design of
the system. For instance, for the system in Figure 4, the
ordering of plc1 and plc2 is arbitrary in the context of
the master program. If there was a race condition and/or
ordering dependency where both programs were writing to the
actuator YellowValve, this would be a flaw by design of
the overall ICS.
B. Compilation and Instrumentation
To compute the updated values of actuators at the end of
a scan cycle, we need to execute the consolidated PLC code
given the state of the sensors. We integrate the consolidated
control code into the SCADMAN-MONITOR and record the
actuations, performed by the control code. Figure 5 provides
an overview of the implementation and shows how the con-
solidated code is incorporated into the SCADMAN-MONITOR.
We use our extended MATIEC compiler6 to compile the
consolidated PLC code to C code. We modified the MATIEC
compiler to automatically generate functions that allow easy
access and modification of the internal state of the generated
C code. This is used by the SCADMAN-MONITOR process to
simulate access to sensor values and actuators.
As a second step, we compile the C code into an intermedi-
ate representation using the LLVM [47] compiler framework.
Operating on the LLVM intermediate code allows us to per-
form analysis and instrumentation without having to analyze
structured text or C code directly. We perform instrumenta-
tion on the generated LLVM intermediate code to introduce
an execution mode that draws from the ideas of symbolic
execution, abstract interpretation and interval arithmetic. We
call this execution mode error-margin multi-execution. We use
this execution mode to reduce the number of false positives by
introducing the notion of an error-margin to accessed sensor
values. We discuss details of this approach in the following
subsection.
The final step is to produce a runnable executable. We
compile the instrumented PLC code to native code and link
it with our support library, providing various utility functions.
The C code generated by the MATIEC compiler is intended
to be linked to a userspace driver that implements hardware
access. Instead we link the generated code with our framework
such that all hardware accesses are intercepted and forwarded
to the state estimation and attack detection.
C. Error-margin Multi-execution
The model of a physical system may deviate from the
real system due to various reasons. For instance, a physical
processes might evolve slower or faster than expected in the
model. These minor differences between the model-based esti-
mated state and the real system state can lead to inconsistencies
that SCADMAN would incorrectly report as an attack. These
false positives can occur, for instance, if the PLCs perform
an actuation depending on whether a sensor value is above
or below a threshold, as shown in the example in Figure 5.
In the real system, the sensor might be above the threshold,
while in the simulated physical system, the sensor is still below
the threshold. In this case, the SCADMAN-MONITOR performs
an actuation, while the real PLC does not, or vice versa. For
instance, this can happen when the weight of a can increases
at a slightly higher rate than estimated by the physical system
model. The reason for this can be a valve, which controls the
inflow of a color into a can and may not necessarily close
within one scan cycle. In our system model, the actuations are
assumed to be immediate, i.e., the valve will be closed and
our system model will reflect an inflow rate of 0. In reality it
may only be partially closed with a nonzero inflow rate. These
6https://github.com/thiagoralves/OpenPLC_v2/
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// 𝑝1 = &𝑠
𝑥1 = load 𝑝1
𝑏1 = fcmp 𝑥1, 800.0
br 𝑏_1, IF_THEN, IF_ELSE
𝑥1 = 𝑥1 + ε
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Figure 5: SCADMAN implementation overview. The consolidated PLC code is compiled in combination with MATIEC and LLVM
to an executable. The ICS network feeds sensor values into SCADMAN-MONITOR to simulate the PLC scan cycle and check
for consistency. The updated outputs are fed from the executable to the state estimation as well. Any deviations in the expected
behavior is alerted to the SCADA monitor.
slight deviations will be propagated to the associated physical
model.
To tackle this problem and reduce false positives, we check
whether the SCADMAN-MONITOR behaves differently in terms
of actuation assuming an error in the sensor readings. We
introduce error-margin multi-execution to detect differences in
actuation. First, we define error-margins for sensors. Second,
we detect whether a PLC performs different actions, when
executed with an error applied to the sensor value. A difference
in the performed actions, are only observed when the PLC is
taking a different control-flow through the program execution.
Therefore, we need to detect whether the control-flow of the
PLC depends on a sensor value (cf. code snippet in Figure 5).
We define an error-margin, ±, for each of the sensors. We
then check whether the SCADMAN-MONITOR performs differ-
ent actuations when applying ± to the sensor reading, which
we denote as s. Using interval arithmetic, one can propagate
the error-margin through the executed program. However, if
a branching condition depends on the sensor value, possibly
two branches must be executed if the decision is inconclusive.
For example, the branching condition is (s < N), then the
execution could take both branches if s+ ≥ N and s− < N .
Therefore, we need to execute multiple paths through the
control program. Symbolic execution would allow us to use
symbolic sensor values and constrain them into the error-
margin and execute multiple paths at once. However, current
symbolic execution engines have known limitations when it
comes to solving constraints for floating point operations [48].
Typically sensor values are represented as floating point types.
To overcome this limitation we introduce multi-execution that
operates solely on concrete floating point values within the
error-margin applied and can execute multiple branches in
parallel.
We integrate this error application into the consolidated
PLC code simulation at the LLVM level. Whenever a con-
ditional branch instruction depends on a sensor value s, we
introduce instrumentation that forks the execution of the PLC
code. In one fork we continue without an error, so s′ = s. In
the second and third fork we continue with the upper bound
of the error-margin s′ = s+  and the lower-bound s′ = s− ,
respectively. Using only the upper and lower bound of the error
interval [s − , s + ] is not sufficient. To be able to evaluate
equality comparisons we need to also continue one fork of
the code on s (without applying any error). At the end of
the scan cycle we merge all forks and continue without any
error applied in the next scan cycle. We create O(3#sensors)
forks per scan cycle. While this is a significant overhead in
the worst case, our evaluation, however, shows the practicality
of this approach. We can use several optimizations in practice
to reduce the number of concurrent forks. For example, if two
forks take the same control-flow path, we can stop executing
one of the two forks. Most basic blocks have only two outgoing
edges, therefore we can usually kill one of the forks directly
after they have taken the branch. In fact, we do not need to
use the multi-execution approach until we detect a discrepancy
in the actuations. We can then selectively re-execute only the
violating scan cycle in multi-execution mode to get a more
accurate result on the actuation.
Instead of producing one value for an actuator we now
get a set of values for each of the actuators. If the actuation
of the real system is not in the set which is reported by the
consolidated PLC code we detected an inconsistency which is
beyond the errors-margins and report an attack. Incorporating
state estimation errors allows SCADMAN to minimize false
positives that would arise with slight errors in the model of
the physical system.
To detect whether a branch condition depends on a sensor
value, we perform backwards data-flow analysis, starting from
the condition of the branch. We use the single static assign-
ment (SSA) of LLVM intermediate code to perform intra-
procedural data-flow analysis. Inter-procedural analysis is not
implemented in our current prototype as the code generated by
MATIEC does not require inter-procedural data-flow analysis
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for most sensors. We search the resulting data-flow graph for
load instructions that read sensor values. Because the load
instruction is contained in the backwards data-flow graph,
we know it will affect the branching condition and must be
instrumented to incorporate the check for forking the process
based on the given error-margins.
Our error-margin multi-execution introduces some impre-
cision into the system. An attacker might try to exploit this
imprecision to evade detection, we discuss this scenario in
more detail in Section VI.
D. Attack Detection
To detect attacks, the SCADMAN-MONITOR performs two
steps, where the results from the n-th scan cycle are used to
predict and verify the n+1-th scan cycle of the system. First
the SCADMAN-MONITOR compares sensor values received
in scan cycle n with the sensor values estimated based on
the inputs from scan cycle n − 1. When the received senor
values are verified, i.e., fall within the set of predicted values,
the SCADMAN-MONITOR uses them as input to execute the
consolidated PLC code. This results in a set of acceptable
actuation operations for scan cycle n. SCADMAN-MONITOR
compares this set against actuation operations reported by the
real PLCs. If the actuations of the real PLCs are verified
correctly they serve as input to the state estimator of the
physical system, which will predict the sensor values for the
next scan cycle n+ 1.
Incomplete data. SCADMAN can also be used on system that
cannot provide complete data or which involve (sub)process
for which no accurate state estimation is possible. This can be
due to various reasons, e.g., if a sensor state depends on human
interactions with the system the SCADMAN-MONITOR cannot
predict the state of that sensor in a meaningful way. However,
the state of other sensors and actuators of the system that are
not directly influenced by such external influence can still be
validated by SCADMAN.
VI. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
In this section we consider different kind of attacks in
the context of ICS and how SCADMAN can detect them.
According to our adversary model (cf. Section III) we consider
a subset of PLCs to be compromised, i.e., k out of n PLCs
are compromised, where k < n.
Afterwards we will discuss attacks scenarios that go be-
yond our adversary model and show that SCADMAN is valuable
in these scenarios as well.
A. k-out-of-n Compromised PLCs
As discussed before, for various reasons the attack might
have compromised a subset of PLCs in an ICS. The adversary
aims to act stealthy, hence, we assume the adversary lets
the compromised PLCs report sensor readings and actuation
commands that meet the expectations of the operator as well
as SCADMAN. However, the reported values will not match
the expected values relative to the values reported by the non-
compromised PLCs.
In particular, as long as one PLC that is physically
interconnected with the compromised PLCs reports correct
values, a discrepancy will emerge. SCADMAN will detect this
discrepancy and will raise an alarm. While SCADMAN will not
be able to identify which PLCs are compromised, it can still
warn the operator, who can then start an in-depth investigation
on the system. In the next section we evaluated SCADMAN
on a large set of ICS attacks implemented for a real-world
industrial control network (SWaT [40]) and show that it can
detect all of these attacks.
Slow evolving attacks. SCADMAN is based on a closed loop
approach where, for each scan cycle, the system is analyzed for
anomalies. The system continues when no anomaly is detected.
By continuing, the current state of the system is accepted as
benign and serves as the basis for estimating the system’s
future state. An adversary could try to exploit this scenario
by slowly pushing the system towards a false state. On each
iteration, the adversary would manipulate the system within
the error margins of SCADMAN. However, ICS are usually
designed to include safety measures programmed into the
PLCs that prevent the system from being steered to an unsafe
state. While the attack can slowly modify the system within
the safety boundaries of the system without being detected, the
system cannot be pushed to an unsafe state. SCADMAN would
detect any deviations in the control flow path of the PLC,
e.g., if an adversary pushes the system outside of the safety
boundaries enforced by a safety check within the control flow
of the original PLC program. The best the adversary can do is
to leverage the simulation error margin used by SCADMAN
to get the system slightly outside of its safety boundaries.
However, the safety boundaries are chosen such that the system
remains safe even in the presence of small errors, e.g., due to
sensor measurement noise.
We discuss additional counter measures in Section IX
B. All PLCs Compromised
SCADMAN provides security based on the assumption that
physical interdependencies of controllers (PLCs) enable the
detection of misbehavior. In the simple case that the entire
system is controlled by a single PLC, an adversary would
control all of the data (e.g., sensor readings) available to
SCADMAN if this PLC is compromised. Hence, an intelligent
adversary can provide a consistent view of the system [31]
towards SCADMAN and remain undetected.
For distributed ICS, the adversary needs to control all PLCs
to provide a coherent view of all actuation commands and
all sensor readings reported to SCADMAN-MONITOR. This
means the adversary has to simulate the expected behavior
of the entire system and synchronizes the actions of all PLCs.
While this might be feasible for very simple and static ICS, the
attacker’s limited resources (PLCs have limited computation
power and memory) significantly aggravate the complexity of
stealthy attacks for dynamic ICS.
C. Network Attacks
In this work we assume a secure channel between
SCADMAN-MONITOR and the PLCs, i.e., an adversary can-
not launch network attacks by impersonating other devices.
However, some legacy systems do not provide secure network
channels, in which cases the adversary might try to overcome
SCADMAN by manipulating network packages.
10
The adversary can either try to manipulate or suppress
network packages of other PLCs, i.e., PLCs not controlled
by the adversary that would reveal the adversary’s behavior
manipulations. This is not possible in commonly used switched
networks, i.e., network packages of an un-compromised PLC
will never be routed to a compromised PLC but directly to
SCADMAN-MONITOR.
The second option for the adversary is to impersonate an-
other PLC, i.e., by sending packages to SCADMAN-MONITOR
pretending to originate from an uncompromised PLC, e.g., by
modifying the source IP address of a package. However, as
discussed before, the adversary cannot suppress packages sent
by the benign PLC, hence, SCADMAN-MONITOR will receive
both types of packages: those with benign sensor reading and
those with manipulated values reported by the adversary. This
mixture of input values will lead to inconsistencies, which will
trigger a security alarm of SCADMAN.
VII. EVALUATIONS
In this section, we provide an overview of our experimental
evaluation of SCADMAN. We first introduce the real-world
industrial control network that we used for our evaluation. We
then discuss how SCADMAN implements code consolidation
for the proprietary PLCs used in our evaluation. Afterwards
we describe the choice of physical state estimation equations
used for our attack detection. Finally, we evaluate SCADMAN
against a set of attacks that were enumerated by previous
works.
A. Evaluation Environment and Dataset
The study reported here was conducted on data from a real
distributed industrial control system [40] as shown below.
Reverse 
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Figure 6: Sub-processes in the industrial water treatment
control network
.
The network is a 6-stage water treatment plant that pro-
duces 5 gallons/minute of treated water. The plant can operate
non-stop 24/7 in fully autonomous mode. The sub-process of
each stage is controlled by an individual PLC (cf. Figure 6.
In total, the plant contains 68 sensors and actuators; some
actuators serve as standbys and are intended to be used only
when the primary actuator fails.
ICS operation: Operation of the plant is initiated by an
operator at the SCADA workstation and, when needed, can be
controlled. State information can be viewed at the workstation
or at the HMI, and is recorded in the historian.
Plant supervision and control: A Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) workstation is located in the plant con-
trol room. Data or control access to nearly all plant components
is available via this workstation. A plant operator can view
process state and set process parameters via the workstation.
A historian is available for recording process state as well as
network packet flows at preset time intervals.
Communications: A multi-layer network enables communica-
tions (as shown in Figure 7) across all components of the net-
work. The ring network at each stage at level 0 enables PLCs to
communicate with sensors and actuators at the corresponding
stage. A star network at level 1 enables communications across
PLCs, SCADA, HMI and the historian. PLCs communicate
with each other through the L1 network, and with centralized
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system
and Human-Machine Interface (HMI), through the Level 2
network.
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Figure 7: Architecture of the control portion of a CPS. P1,
P2,...,Pn denote PLCs.
Dataset. We evaluated SCADMAN using data generated by
the industrial control network shown in Figure 6. The dataset
includes both normal operations to evaluate the false positive
rate of SCADMAN as well as attacks to evaluate the detection
performance of SCADMAN. The attack data, containing data
from a total of thirty-six attacks, were generated independently
of our work, modeled after Adepu et al. [6], [8] and was used
in previous works to evaluate ICS security solutions [35].
The dataset contains data collected during seven days of
continuous operation of the ICS network. It contains 496, 800
data points, each point representing the system state using
53 features of the system, e.g., sensor values and actuator
states. The sensor data indicates the states of various plant
components including tanks, valves, pumps, and meters, as
well as data on chemical properties including pH, conductivity,
and the Oxidation Reduction Potential (ORP).
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B. SCADMAN State Estimation
We now describe how we evaluated each component of
SCADMAN’s implementation in order to generate the cyber-
physical state estimator.
ICS network PLC code consolidation. The network consists
of six Allen Bradley PLCs using proprietary code and develop-
ment tools. Each PLC was programmed individually using the
proprietary Rockwell Automation Studio 5000 development
environment. In order to perform the code consolidation for
each PLC, we first needed to translate the heterogeneously pro-
grammed controller projects to a single IEC 61131-3 standard
structured text format. To do so, we extracted the L5X project
files for each PLC [14]. The L5X format is an XML format
used for importing/exporting projects to and from the Studio
5000 environment. We then built a translation tool, L5X2IEC,
using an existing l5x Python library7 that provides accessors
for the XML elements within the L5X files. Although the Allen
Bradley PLC programming languages conform to the IEC
standards, we needed to provide translations for the proprietary
extensions of each language.
Physical state estimation. SCADMAN provides physical state
estimation for sensors whose sensor and actuation dependen-
cies are satisfied. For instance, we cannot predict the value of
a water tank if we do not have access to the corresponding
flow rate sensor. We provide generic physical state estimators
for the water tank level sensors, the flow rate level sensors, as
well as the status indicators for pumps and valves. However,
models for other components of the system can be added in
future work.
For water tanks, we used the same estimation and threshold
values provided in prior analyses of the ICS network plat-
form [7], [10]. SCADMAN implements the following closed-
loop state estimation models:
TankLevel = TankLevel + (Inflow −Outflow) ∗ Fc.
Where Inflow and Outflow are the inflow/outflow rates of
the tank and Fc is a conversion constant for the flow rate.
For flow rates, we derived a closed-loop model that incor-
porates any actuators that may open/close the flow of water:
FlowRate = FlowRate ∗∏Nn=1Actuatorn
Where Actuatorn represents any pump or value whose value
is 0 (for off) or 1 (for on). For our analyses, we use the
plant invariants that capture the state of the system at any
point of time [7]. Each model is then invoked automatically
when a particular variable needs to be estimated. In addition
to providing generic models for these subsystems, the models
for the binary values of the actuator states are automatically
generated by our SCADMAN-MONITOR executable.
C. Attack Detection
We were able to successfully detect all attacks enumerated
in the attack data set. We further evaluated SCADMAN against
the record-and-replay attacks enumerated in a previous case
7https://pypi.python.org/pypi/l5x/1.2
study, where sensor values were recorded and replayed back
to the HMI to spoof sensor values as was done in the Stuxnet
malware [10]. For the non-optimized evaluation, SCADMAN
had 0 false negatives with a very low false positive rate of
0.36% for the nominal water tank level deviation threshold in
the implementation without multi-execution. The false posi-
tives were due to the cases mentioned in section V, where an
actuator may open/close a tick too early or too late based on
our estimated sensor values.
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Figure 8: ROC curve for attack detection across varying water
tank deviation thresholds for both single and multi-execution
analysis.
False positive pruning. All false positives were pruned by our
error-margin multi-execution implementation for the nominal
water tank level deviation threshold. We show the associated
ROC curves of varying water tank level deviation thresholds
for both the normal execution and the error-margin multi-
execution in Figure 8. False positives only exist for very small
threshold values, i.e., a threshold value that is less than 1mm
for the water tank level will obviously result in some false
positive rate. The nominal threshold values were based on
the threshold values used for state estimation in a previous
work [10]. The nominal threshold value of 5mm obtained from
our ROC curve confirmed the choice in the previous work.
Performance. We performed our evaluation on a sys-
tem equipped with an Intel Core i7-4710MQ Processor at
2.50GHz, 16GB of RAM running Linux v4.4.0-112-generic.
Running SCADMAN on the entire dataset of seven days took 30
hours for the single threaded deviation-checking, and 51 hours
for the multi-threaded error-margin multi-execution using our
current prototype implementation that is not optimized for
performance. This shows that SCADMAN can “keep up” when
running in parallel with the real system even on a desktop-
grade computer.
Memory. The memory usage of SCADMAN was 36MB on
average with a peak memory requirement of 149MB, with
multi-execution turned off. This shows that SCADMAN can be
used to constantly monitor the system behavior using standard
server equipment.
Communication. By default, all PLCs communicate with the
SCADA system to display the operational process data and
to store the operational data in a historian. SCADMAN can
retrieve its data from the historian causing no communication
overhead in the PLC network.
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VIII. RELATED WORK
The previous works on ICS security can be categorized
into cyber-physical security mechanisms that are implemented
within the ICS controller to enforce code integrity and moni-
toring solutions that abstract the control of PLCs to verify the
overall cyber-physical system.
Internal CPS control security. ECFI [4] provides a control-
flow integrity (CFI) solution for PLCs, where the code run-
ning on the PLC is instrumented to validate whether indirect
branches follow a legitimate path in the control-flow graph
(CFG). SCADMAN does not need any modifications of the
code running on the PLC. In contrast, it monitors the overall
behavior of the PLC reflecting its entire software (including
the OS). Furthermore, SCADMAN provides context sensitive
control-flow checking, i.e., the set of allowed CFG paths is
further restricted based on the current system state.
Control-Flow Attestation (C-FLAT) enables a prover device
to attest the exact control-flow path of an executed program
to a remote verifier [5]. However, it cannot be applied to
existing systems that do not have the necessary hardware
security extensions such as the ARM TrustZone. PyCRA [63]
uses a physical challenge-response authentication to protect
active sensing systems against cyber physical attacks. PyCRA’s
focus on active sensors, hence it is not applicable to passive
sensors nor to actuators, both of which are also common in
ICS. Orpheus [20] monitors the behavior of a program based
on executed system calls and checks whether a system call is
legitimate in the given context. The decision is made based
on a finite-state machine (FSM) representing the programs
system call behavior, i.e., system calls are only allowed to be
executed in sequences for which valid transitions exist within
the FSM. Orpheus requires a FSM of the monitored system,
which needs to be constructed in a learning phase. SCADMAN
does not require such a model of the overall system but only
models for the individual subprocesses of the physical system.
Also, Orpheus performs detection on the device and relies on
an un-compromised OS and that physical event reports are
untampered. SCADMAN does not require any modifications to
the monitored devices and does not require a trusted channel
to input sensors.
Zeus [37] monitors the control flow of a PLC control
program by monitoring the electromagnetic emissions side
channels of the PLC by a neural network model. Such a
defense does not protect against data attacks and can further be
circumvented via firmware modification attacks. Furthermore,
Zeus cannot account for verifying other the other networked
components as in the SCADMAN framework.
State estimation has been used within the PLCs to detect
if any of the invariant properties of the system have been
violated [7], [10], [11]. This enforcement resides in the ap-
plication layer of a single PLC, which can be circumvented if
the PLC is compromised. Furthermore, the physical invariants
and their dependencies are specified manually. SCADMAN au-
tomatically enforces the checking of discrete-state transitions
by analyzing the consolidated PLC code. Similarly, on-device
runtime verification has been proposed for PLCs with coupled
hypervisors [33]. The hypervisor resides above the firmware
and relies on the integrity of the PLC control logic.
TSV [53] verifies the integrity of any program being loaded
onto a PLC by lifting the associated binary to an intermediate
language to symbolically execute the program and verify that
it is not violating any of the provided infrastructural safety
requirements. The safety requirements are enforced within the
PLC by extension of the guarantees provided by TSV. Simi-
larly, PLCVerif [23] provides a framework for checking safety
properties of PLC code against finite state automata. These
solutions are offline analyses that do not provide any runtime
guarantees and only verify the control logic application code.
External CPS control security. Previous works have proposed
means of detecting stealthy attacks in the context of ICS. David
et. al. [66] reported on limiting the impact of stealthy attacks
on industrial control systems. Liu et .al. [50], [52] presented
false data injection attacks against state estimation in electric
power grids. This work is implemented mainly in a simulation
environment, where they are considering stealthy attacks on
smart meters. In SCADMAN, we also consider stealthy attacks
on multiple sensors and actuators on real-time operational data.
Yuqi et. al. [18], [19] proposed an approach for learning
physical invariants that combines machine learning with ideas
from mutation testing. Initial models are learned using support
vector machines. These learned models are used for code attes-
tation and identifying standard network attacks. Configuration
based intrusion detection system have also been proposed for
Advanced Metering Infrastructure [12]. The AMI behavior is
modeled using event logs collected at smart meters. Event logs
are modeled using Markov chains and linear temporal logic
for the verification of specifications. However, such models
depend on the completeness of the training data set used for
the learned models. A water control system was modeled
using an autoregressive model in order to monitor physics
of the system [36]. For distributed systems with complex
cyber-physical interdependencies, it is infeasible to assume
all discrete states of the system will be traversed. SCADMAN
automatically contains a discrete-state model of the entire
ICS and depends only on the accuracy of the physical state
estimation. In a similar vein, the idea of detecting attacks by
monitoring physics [22], [58] of the ICS by using invariants
has been applied. However, in these instances the invariants
were derived manually based on domain knowledge. SCAD-
MAN automatically derives these cyber-physical invariants and
significantly reduces the probability of human error during the
modelling phase of complex systems.
IX. FUTURE WORK
In this section we propose possible extensions of SCAD-
MAN to improve its security and functionalities.
Simulation interval. The current implementation of SCAD-
MAN uses a closed loop approach where the system state
s after each scan cycle is serving as the basis for the next
round. However, SCADMAN can be extended to use state s
only after n scan cycles. This means that the state estimation
and multi-execution performed by SCADMAN must cover n
scan cycles, which could lead to larger errors in the state
estimation, which in turn could impact the error-margin multi-
execution of SCADMAN negatively. However, this approach
can make slowly evolving attacks (see Section VI) even more
complicated, further increasing the security of SCADMAN.
Automated invariant generation. SCADMAN cannot only
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serve as a security solution but can also help improve the
functional correctness and safety of an ICS. Our modeling
framework can be used to determine interdependencies of sys-
tem variables. This information is useful when programming
an ICS as it helps to identify conditions and safety checks
that need to be included in the PLCs for the ICS to operate
correctly.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
Industrial control systems (ICS) are ubiquitous and in-
creasingly deployed in critical infrastructures. In fact, recent
large-scale cyber attacks (e.g., Stuxnet, BlackEnergy, Duqu to
name a few) exploit vulnerabilities in these systems. Building
a generic defense mechanism against the various ICS attack
flavors is highly challenging. However, we observe that all
these attacks influence the physics of these devices. As a
result, we developed SCADMAN, a system that preserves
the Control Behavior Integrity (CBI) of distributed cyber-
physical systems. SCADMAN provides real time monitoring for
intrusion detection and sensor fault detection by maintaining
a cyber-physical state estimation of the system based on a
novel control code consolidation generation as well as state
estimation equations of the physical processes. SCADMAN
enforces the correctness of individual controllers in the system
by verifying the actuation values being sent from the PLCs as
well as the associated changes that propagated through the
physical dynamics of the system. We evaluated SCADMAN
against an enumerated set of attacks on a real water treatment
testbed. Our results show that we can detect a wide range of
attacks in a timely fashion with zero false positives for nominal
threshold values.
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